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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court
ranting a perpetual stay of execution on a default judglent. The stay of execution was granted on the ground
~at the indebtedness sued upon had been discharged in
~ankruptcy.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellants obtained a judgment by default against
in the District Court. The court su.bsequently
;sued its order granting a perpetual stay of execution on
~e judgment.
~spondents
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order vacating the District Cour
order of perpetual stay of execution or, alternatively, :
order remanding the matter for trial on the issue of d1
chargeability of indebtedness.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The indebtedness owed by respondents to appellan
arose out of business dealings between the parties. Appt
lants were principals and respondents were factors or cor
mission merchants. The relationship of the parties w,
established by past conduct but particularly by a "Co
signment Agreement" ( R. 4). By the terms of the agre
ment appellants were to deviler to respondents merchandis
particularly sewing machines, which respondents wou
undertake to sell. The agreement contained the usu
standard provisions of a consignment agreement. Title
the merchandise was to remain in appellants. A portion
the proceeds of the sales of the merchandise, based up(
sales price from appellants to respondents, was to vest
and remain the property of appellants and was to be r
mitted to appellants.
In addition to the Consignment Agreement, the parti
entered into what appellants describe as a "Condition
Agreement," which was for the purpose of providing app1
lants additional security for the merchandise turned ov
to respondents. By the terms of this second agreeme
respondents pledged and assigned to appellants certa
dealers' reserve accounts in finance companies and two mot
vehicles. The agreements contained a general stateme
that monies and proceeds were to be held in trust.
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Respondt·nts suffered financial reverses and failed to
emit funds to appellants for the sale of merchandise. Out
f these business dealings respondents became indebted to
ppellants in the sum of about $6,000. In March 1961,
.ppt·1lants instituted suit against respondents for the inlebtedness. On February 8, 1962, respondents filed a bankuptcy petition and properly scheduled the indebtedness
1wing to appellants in the sum of $6,668.83. On July 31,
.962, default judgment was rendered against respondent.
lespondent was discharged in bankruptcy on November 20,
.962. Subsequently, upon respondent's motion, the District
:omi issued its order granting the perpetual stay of exe!tttion on the said default judgment.
Although appellants' brief contains assertions charging
·espondent with ..obtaining money by false pretenses," "wil:ul and malicious injury to property," "fraud," "embezzlenent," "misappropriation," or "defalcation," no such alle~ations were made in appellants' Complaint.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR
BURDEN AND HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT RESPONDENTS' DEBT SHOULD NOT BE DISCHARGED
IN BANKRUPTCY.

The Utah Supreme Court has held in the case of
National Finance Company of Provo vs. Daley, 14 Utah 2d
263, that in determining dischargeability of a judgment, the
court will look only to the judgment and the record of the
case upon which it was based. Quoting from the opinion
of the Utah Supreme Court at page 266 of the Utah 2d
Report, the considerations supporting this rule are set forth
as follows:
"In our judgment it better comports with the
orderly process of justice to require the plaintiff to
bear the responsibility of pleading, proving and claiming the full benefit of whatever character of cause of
action he possesses in the original action and of being
bound thereby, than to allow another trial upon the
same cause of action raising issues which could have
been dealt with in the original action. This rule also
serves the purpose of the bankruptcy act and at the
same time leaves the way open to guard against the
discharge of debts of the character excepted from discharge if the facts so justify."
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The judgment which appellants claim falls within the
ext·eption of S£'ction 17 of the Bankruptcy Act relative to
obtaining property by false pretenses and wilful and malicious injury to property right, was obtained by default and
default judgment ( R. 15, 16 ). No findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered.
An analysis of the plaintiffs' complaint against the respondents dicloses that paragraphs 1 through 5 allege matters of agreement, title retention and trust rights between
appellants and respondents.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 allege that respondents did not
keep their agreements, and wrongfully appropriated plaintiffs' property to their personal use, and failed to account
for certain funds and the disposition of two automobiles
on which respondents had given a second mortgage to
appellants. There is no allegation in the complaint that
respondents obtained money or property by false pretenses
from appellants, or that any of their actions were alleged
to have been wilful and malicious injuries to appellants'
property.
Granting that the failure of respondents to answer the
complaint of appellants', and the entry of· the respondents'
default does constitute an admission of the allegations of
plaintiffs' complaint, a reading of the complaint clearly
shows that the obligation in question does not come within
the exception to Section 17 of the Banlcruptcy Act because
there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents
obtained property by means of false pretenses practiced
upon the appellants, nor that any act done by them constitutes a wilful and malicious injury to the property of appellants. There is no allegation or showing in the record that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1·espondents intentionally failed to keep their agreement
with appellants or intentionally diverted any trust funds
in which appellants had rights. The claims made by appellants with reference to the chattel mortgages given on
the automobiles are without merit because such mortgages
were second to those in favor of a third party, and there is
no claim in the con1plaint as to what respondents did with
the vehicles other than to fail to account to appellants for
them.
The cases cited by appellants in support of their argument in Point I as to the wilful and malicious injury to
their property are not in point because in each case either
the complaint's alleged wilful and malicious injury to specific property rights, or the court made specific findings in
the case that the actions of the defendants were in fact
wilful and malicious.
The rule announced by the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah in the Daley case, supra, confine the inquiry in
this proceeding to the record of the case as sa1ne is presently
before this court, and does not permit new findings or conclusions on the question of malice or wilfulness at the
appellate court level. For this court to permit otherwise
would enable creditors whose claims have been listed in
bankruptcy proceedings to relitigate matters of fraud, wilful
and malicious injury, and other matters within Section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act the second time when they had
once elected to bring suit for the claim without setting up
such circumstances which may have exempted the claim
from a discharge in bankruptcy.
The cases cited by appellants which show that judgments for wilful and malicious injury to property may not
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be dischargable under the Bankruptcy Act are not disputed
by respondents. The law in this area is clear. However,
to take advantage of this exception to the Bankruptcy Act,
it is encumbent upon the party claiming his judgment to
be within the exception to make a clear showing in this
respect. All of the cases cited by appellants on this point
contain specific findings in the record of the case that the
injury to property did result from wilful and malicious
action by the other party. The record in the case before
this court does not disclose that respondents were guilty
of such action. Having failed to sustain its burden in this
respect, this Court should affirm the decision of the lower
court in this matter.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH APPELLANTS WERE NOT ACTING IN A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE BANKRUPTCY STATUTE.
A bankrupt is entitled to have the Banlauptcy Act
liberally construed in his favor. ]ones v. Gerts ( C.A. lOth,
1941), 121 F. 2d 782, and In Re Newman (C.A. 6th, 1942),
126 F. 2d 336.
Appellants' argument under Point II of their brief is
that respondents in their relationship to appellants were
acting in a fiduciary capacity, and consequently, by virtue
of the exceptions set forth in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act (11 U.S.C.A. 35), the indebtedness was not discharged.
The pertinent portions of that section are as follows:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, , , 0 except such as
0 0 0
( 4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an
officer or in any fiduciary capacity; 0 0 0 ."
It is a well established rule that brokers, factors and

commission merchants are not acting in a "fiduciary capacity" as that term is used in the Bankruptcy Act. Crawford

v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176; Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293
U. S. 328; Swift & Co. v, Bullard & Son, 3 F. 2d 814; Royal
Indemnity Co. v. Sherman, 269 P. 2d 123; 9 Am. Jur. 2d
604, Banlauptcy, Section 802; see also the cases annotated
in 42 A.L.R. 2d 896.
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As set forth in the Statement of Facts, and as acknowledged by appellants, respondents were factors, or commission merchants. The indebtedness arose out of the business
relationship between the parties. The courts in a long history interpreting the above provision of the Bankruptcy Act,
have construed the term "fiduciary capacity" to be one
created or established by an express or technical trust and
not one arising from implications from contract. Chapman
v. Fvrsyth, 2 How. 202. The reason for this construction
of the rule is sound. If the term was construed to embrace
every fiduciary capacity, it would be difficult to limit its
application - it would include all debts arising from agencies in all cases where the law implies an obligation from
the trust reposed in the debtor. The Supreme Court in
the Chapman case said:
"Such a construction would have left but few debts
on which the law could operate. In almost all the
commercial transactions of the country, confidence is
reposed in the punctuality and integrity of the debtor,
and a violation of these is, in a commercial sense, a
disregard of a trust. 0 0 0 •
0

o. The act speaks of technical trusts, and not
those which the law implies from the contract. A
factor is not, therefore, within the act."
"

o

See also Emery & Kaufman, Ltd. v. H eyl (La. 1954), 80 So.
2d 95 and Shapiro v. Marzigliano (N.J. 1956), 120 A. 2d
490.
In establishing the relationship existing between the
parties, their business dealings plus all the written agreements must be viewed and considered as a whole. Davis
v. Aetna Acceptance Co., supra. Although the agreements
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between the parties contained a statement that certain
monies or proceeds were to be held in trust, the agreements
could by no means be considered to constitute express or
technical trusts. The one was a consignment agreement,
the other a conditional or security agreement.
The courts have concluded that a statement in a contract that funds are to be held in trust does not create the
fiduciary capacity of which the statute speaks. In Upshur
v. Briscoe, 138 U. S. 365, the United States Supreme Court
used the following language:
"The statement in the paper signed by Andrews,
that Briscoe accepts the 'trust,' the statement in the
paper signed by Briscoe, that he accepts the 'mandate,'
and the statement in the paper signed by Annie M.
Andrews, that she accepts the appointment of Briscoe
'as her trustee,' does not create a 'trust' in its technical
sense, or make the debt of Briscoe one created by
him while acting in a 'fiduciary character.' The relation created was merely the usual one of contract
between debtor and creditor. Within the meaning of
the exception in the bankruptcy act, a debt is not
created by a person while acting in a 'fiduciary character,' merely because it is created under circumstances in which trust or confidence is reposed in the
debtor, in the popular sense of those terms."
In American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Berry (Me.
1913), 87 Atl. 218, the defendant bankrupt was indebted
to plaintiff for proceeds of fertilizers shipped to defendant
for sale as plaintiff's agent. The contract between the
parties contained the following language:
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.. 'All proct'eds of sales and goods remaining unsold
to be our property and you are to have no title or lien
upon said fertilizers, or their proceeds. It is specially
agreed that you will hold the same in trust and separate for the settlement of our account with you. All
sales shall be guaranteed by you, and the specific proceeds of the same are to be sent to us as received by
you; and, until the proceeds of such sales are receiv~~
by us, the same shall be held by you in trust for us.
The court said:
"But this in no wise changes or strengthens the
plaintiff's case. The use of the word 'trust' does not
alter the relations between the parties so as to create
such a fiduciary capacity as would escape the bankrupt
act. That relation was fixed by the nature of the
transaction itself and grew out of the transaction as
between principal and agent, or owner and factor.
0

0

0 ,

In ~lichelin Tire Co. v. Heatn (Tex. 1916), 188 S.W.
943, defendant bankrupt was sued upon an account based
on a contract covering a consignment of automobile tires.
The contract provided that the defendant was to hold the
proceeds of sale "separate and apart and in trust" for the
plaintiff. The court held that this did not create the fiduciary capacity so as to exempt the indebtedness from discharge.
Appellants cite three cases under Point II in their brief.
Gulp r.:. Robey, 229 S.W. 846, involved a suit by Culp, a
trustee of a trust company organized as an unincorporated
association, against Robey, to recover funds misappropriated
by Robey while he was acting as trustee of the trust company. It particularly concerns the status of partners and
stockholders; the case does not involve factors or commisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sion merchants. In Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. 522, defendant was plaintiff's agent, who was given plaintiff's money
for purposes of making loans to others and secured by
mortgages and deeds of trust. The Court held that in respect of the collections made by the defendant independently of his trusteeship in the deeds of trust, his liability
was released by his discharge in bankruptcy. The court
did hold that since defendant had made himself the trustee
in certain of the deeds of trust, he was as to those instruments a trustee of an express trust and that as to monies
collected on foreclosure of the deeds of trust he was acting
in a "fiduciary capacity." The court's opinion includes the
following significant statement:
"Judge Brown, in Re Basch (D. C.) 97 Fed. 761,
has applied the same construction to the term 'fiduciary capacity' under the present bankrupt act, and
held that a debt due by the bankrupt in the character
of a commission merchant, arising out of his failure
to account for the value of goods consigned to him
for sale on commission, on a contract to return the
goods or their specific proceeds, is not a debt created
by the bankrupt's 'fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,' and was therefore released by his discharge in
bankruptcy."
In Mathieu v. Goldberg, 156 Fed. 541, the relationship
of the parties was that of principal and factor, as here.
However, the court's holding was based on a specific finding
that the defendant's conduct amounted to fraud and embezzlement. No such allegation is contained in appellants'
Complaint. (See Point I of this brief. )
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Appellants contend on page 11 of their brief that with
reference to the vehicles respondent was a mortgagor, and
the failure to account for proceeds received from sale of
the mortgaged vehicles constituted breach of a fiduciary
relationship. This argument is expressly denied by the
United States Supreme Court in the Davis case, supra, which
considt·red the status of a mortgagor of an automobile who
had executed a note, chattel mortgage, trust reecipt and
bill of sale as security for a loan. The Court held that the
liability for conversion of the automobile did not constitute
liability arising from fraud or misappropriation of the bankrupt while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo said:
"The substance of the transaction is this, and nothing more, that the mortgagor, a ·debtor, has bound
himseH by covenant not to sell the mortgaged chattel
without the mortgagee's approval. The resulting obligation is not turned into one arising from a trust
because the parties to one of the documents have
chosen to speak of it as a trust."
In the same general area the cases hold that a bailee
is not acting in a "fiduciary capacity," LetVis v. Shaw, 106
N.Y.S. 1012; Sumner v. Richie, 6 N.W. 752; and Herman
v. Lynch, 26 Kan. 435, nor is a pledgee, H ennequin v. Clews,
111 U.S. 176; Crawford, supra; In re Toklas, 201 Fed. 377
and In re Ennis, 171 Fed. 755.
As appellants have argued, there is a minority view to
the contrary and cases so holding are cited in 42 A.L.R. 2d
896, supra, beginning at page 902. However, it is significant that a number of these cases have been overruled.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently adhered
to the general rule stated above.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents' indebtedness to appellants was scheduled
in the bankruptcy proceeding, and respondents were properly discharged. There are no allegations in appellants' complaint to the effect that respondents were guilty of obtaining
property by false pretenses or that they caused wilful and
malicious injury to appellants' property; nor is there any
allegation in the con1plaint that respondents were guilty of
fraud or embezzlement. The respondent's relation to appellants was that of a factor; a fiduciary capacity did not
exist.
The District Court's order of a perpetual stay of execution should not be disturbed. Appellants' appeal should
be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,
BALLIF & BALLIF,
Attorneys for Harold L. Barrick
WAYNE C. DURHAM,
Attorney for Fred M. Poulson
(Paulson)
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